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Barnabei v. Angelone
214 F.3d 463 (4th Cir. 2000)
L Facts
On September 22, 1993, the nude body of Sarah Wisnosky
("Wisnosky) was found floating in the LaFayette River, in Norfolk,
Virginia.1 Wisnosky was a student at Old Dominion University ("ODU").
Derek Barnabei ('Barnabei"), petitioner, moved to the Norfolk area in
August 1993. He claimed to be a member of Tau Kappa Epsilon ("TKE")
at Rutgers University and moved into a boarding house with TKE members
from ODU. Barnabei and Wisnosky met and she spent the night at his
house on several occasions. While Barnabei said that they had never had sex,
Wisnosky said that "he [was] alright, but [she had] had better."2 When
Barnabei was told about this comment, he became "agitated" and claimed
to have only engaged in oral sex with Wisnosky.3
On September 22, 1993 at 1:00 a.m., a TKE pledge drove Barnabei
home and saw that Wisnosky was waiting there. Members of Barnabei's
boarding house claimed to have heard loud music coming from Barnabei's
locked room and noticed that he appeared agitated. In the morning a shoe,
later identified as Wisnosky's, was found near the rear of Barnabei's car.4
That afternoon, Barnabei went to Towson, Maryland. On September 23,
the police searched Barnabei's room and discovered blood stains that
matched Wisnosky's. DNA tests also revealed that sperm samples taken
from Wisnosky's body were most likely Barnabei's. Barnabei was arrested
in Ohio in December 1993.-
On June 14, 1995, a Virginia jury convicted Barnabei of raping and
murdering Wisnosky, and sentenced him to death.6 After exhausting his
state remedies, Barnabei filed a petition for federal habeas relief which the
1. Barnabei v. Angelone, 214 F.3d 463, 465-66 (4th Cir. 2000). An autopsy revealed
that Wisnosky had suffered a fractured skull as a result of no less than ten severe blows to the
head, inflicted by a heavy blunt object. Id. Wisnosky's autopsy further revealed bruising to
the abdomen, neck, and larynx, as well as manifestations of mechanical asphyxia. Id.
Additionally, injuries to Wisnosky's vaginal and anal areas were'discovered. Id. The head
injuries were the primary cause of death and mechanical asphyxia was a contributing factor.
Id.
2. Id. at 466.
3. Id.
4. Id. Barnabei was also seen carrying a duffle bag that had a very strong odor.
Barnabei claimed that it was his laundry. Id. at 467.
5. Id. at 466-68.
6. Id. at 465.
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district court dismissed! Barnabei sought to raise in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit the following challenges to his
conviction, sentence, and subsequent proceedings in state court: (1) the
district court abused its discretion in refusing to order forensic testing of
certain evidence;' (2) the district court applied an incorrect standard of
review in evaluating his claims;9 (3) he was denied effective assistance of
counsel at trial by his counsel's failure to counter the forensic evidence of
rape;1" (4) he was denied effective assistance of counsel by his attorney's
failure to object to the verdict form;11 (5) the "vileness" aggravating factor
was unconstitutionally vague;12 (6) admission of his ex-wife's testimony
containing unadjudicated criminal conduct during sentencing violated his
right to due process; "3 and (7) the trial court was constitutionally required
to inform the jury that a life sentence would have rendered Barnabei ineligi-
ble for parole for twenty-five years.'
I. Holding
The Fourth Circuit denied Barnabei's request for a certificate of
appealability and affirmed the dismissal of his federal habeas petition."
III. Analysis /Application in Virginia
A. Abuse of Discretion
Barnabei contended that the district court abused its discretion by
refusing to order additional DNA and forensic testing. 6 Specifically, he
argued that blood on fingernail clippings taken from Wisnosky should have
been tested because they may have implicated another suspect. 7 Barnabei
also maintained that over twenty hairs, a bloody pair of moccasins, and two
bloody towels should also have been tested.'"
The Fourth Circuit looked to Rule 6(a) of the rules governing section
2254 cases and found that a district court has the discretion to order addi-
7. Id.
8. Id. at 474.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 470-71.
11. Id. at 471-72.
12. Id. at 472.
13. Id. at 472-74.
14. Id. at 474.
15. Id. at 465.




tional discovery in a section 2254 case for good cause shown. 9 Barnabei
failed to meet the "good cause" requirement." The cases Barnabei cited in
support of his argument were distinguishable because, unlike in the present
case, those defendants offered compelling support for a credible alternative
theory of the crime for which they were convicted."' The Fourth Circuit
decided that Barnabei's showing did not meet this standard.' It is impor-
tant to note that a high burden, "compelling support for a credible alterna-
tive theory," must be met to show good cause before a district court will
order additional forensic discovery.
B. Standard ofReview
Barnabei argued that because the Supreme Court of Virginia cited little
federal law in its rejection of his claims on direct appeal and no federal law
in its summary order on state habeas, the district court should have re-
viewed his federal habeas claims de novo.' The Fourth Circuit determined
that "even a perfunctory state court decision constitutes an adjudication 'on
the merits' for the purposes of federal habeas review." 4 The court found
that the district court independently ascertained whether the record re-
vealed a violation of Barnabei's rights, and in doing so, struck the proper
balance between recognizing the legal effect of the prior state court adjudica-
tion and reviewing te issues raised." Thus, in the instant case, de novo
review by a federal habeas court is inappropriate under 28 U.S.C. S
2254(d).26
C. Ineffective Assistance -- Forensic Evidence of Rape
Barnabei contended that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
failing to present medical evidence to contradict the Commonwealth's
19. Id.; see Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132,5 104,
110 Stat. 1214, 1218-19 (1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 5 2254 (Supp. I 1997)).
20. Barnabei, 214 F.3d at 474.
21. Id.; see Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1012 (9th Cir. 1997) (reversing denial of
discovery of forensic evidence when there was specific evidence linking another suspect to
the murder); Toney v. Gammon, 79 F.3d 693, 697 (8th Cir. 1996) (reversing denial of
discovery of DNA evidence in rape case in which both victim and witness offered consistent
physical descriptions of attacker that did not match petitioner).
22. Barnabei, 214 F.3d at 474.
23. Id. at 469.
24. Id.
25. Id.
.26. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. S2254(d) (1996) (allowing a federal court to grant anapplication
for habeas relief on a claim that was previously adjudicated on the merits in state court only
if that adjudication (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreason-
able application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding).
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assertion that Wisnosky's vaginal injuries were the result of rape." Barnabei
cited two medical texts, studies, and affidavits of two physicians to support
the contention that Wisnosky's injuries were also consistent with consen-
sual sex or certain non-sexual activities."8 The evidence of the vaginal bruise
was particularly important because rage was the predicate offense on which
the capital murder charge was based.
The Fourth Circuit examined Barnabei's claim under the two prong
standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington. °  Barnabei argued that
counsel's failure to consult medical texts and experts was unreasonable and
prejudicial under Strickland.1 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court's
finding that counsel's failure to investigate one of the Commonwealth's
expert witnesses was unreasonable, but that the defendant was not preju-
diced as required by Strickland's second prong.
32
The court determined that the evidence presented at trial, taken as a
whole, made it a virtual certainty that Barnabei raped Wisnosky." Barnabei
wanted each item of evidence to be considered in isolation, but the court
said that the evidence must be evaluated as a whole.' Thus, trial counsel
was not held to be ineffective on the issue of forensic evidence of rape.3"
27. Barnabei, 214 F.3d at 469-70.
28. Id. at 470.
29. Id.
30. Id.; see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984) (holding that a
finding of ineffective assistance of counsel may be made if (1) counsel's performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness in light of prevailing professional norms, and
(2) there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different).
31. Barnabei, 214 F.3d at 470. According to Barnabei, if counsel had reviewed medical
literature, cross-examination would have been more effective, independent evidence rebutting
prosecution expert's conclusions would have been presented, and a proffer sufficient to
convince the trial court to appoint a defense expert might have been formulated. Id.
32. Id. Specifically, the trial court found that counsel's failure to investigate the
Commonwealth expert's medical findings was unreasonable. Id.
33. Barnabei, 214 F.3d at 470. The evidence included the following: vaginal and anal
injuries sustained by Wisnosky; testimony that Wisnosky was at Barnabei's house shortly
before two a.m. on the night of her murder; the presence of Wisnosky's blood in Barnabei's
bedroom; and the presence of Barnabei's semen on a vaginal swab taken from Wisnosky's
body. Id.
34. Id. at 471. Barnabei contended that a woman could incur a vaginal bruise during
consensual sex; that she could have incurred an anal tear shortly before she was murdered but
not have been vaginally raped around the same time; and that she could have had consensual
sex with a partner who murdered her shortly thereafter. Id. The court rejected Barnabei's
contention that these "extraordinarily unlikely circumstances" converged in this case and
viewed the evidence as a whole. Id. The court also noted that trial counsel was able to elicit
on cross-examination a concession from the Commonwealth's expert that the bruise could




D. Ineffective Assistance -- Verdict Form
Barnabei asserted that he was denied effective assistance by his counsel's
failure to object to the verdict form. 6 In Virginia, a defendant may be
sentenced to death if the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that one of
two aggravating factors, vileness or future dangerousness, exists." In
Barnabei's trial, the jury submitted its verdict on a form which stated that
a unanimous finding on the first agravating factor (future dangerousness)
"and/or" the second aggravating factor (vileness) was made." Barnabei
contended that the use of "and/or" permitted the jury to sentence him to
death without unanimity on either one of the two aggravators. 9 He claim-
ed that counsel's failure to object to the "and/or" language was prejudicial.?
The Supreme Court of Virginia found no merit in Barnabei's claim that
counsel's failure to object to the form amounted to ineffective assistance.
Because the objection to the verdict form was a state law issue, the Fourth
Circuit deferred to the judgement of the state courts.42 The court further
stated that the Virginia courts have consistently upheld the use of "and/or"
verdict forms and declined to overturn death sentences when they could not
determine whether the juries unanimously agreed on either of the two
aggravators.4'
E. cVileness" Aggravator
Barnabei contended that the "vileness" aggravator was unconstitution-
ally vague." The Fourth Circuit summarily dismissed this daim based upon
recent precedent. 4' The court also noted that the constitutional challenge
to the vileness aggravator had been raised on numerous occasions, but
rejected each time.
F Denial of Due Process
Barnabei asserted that he was denied due process during sentencing
when his ex-wife, Paula Barto ("Barto"), testified that on one occasion
36. Id.
37. VA. CODE ANN. 5 19.2-264.2 (Mofichie 2000); see Barnabei, 214 F.3d at 471.
38. Barnabei, 214 F.3d at 471; see VA. CODE ANN. SS 19.2-264.2, 19.2-264.4(C), (D)
(Michie 2000).
39. Barnabei, 214 F.3d at 471.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 471-72.
43. Id. at 472. See generally M. Kate Calvert, Obtaining Unanimity and a Standard of
Proof on the Irdeness Sub&Elements with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 13 CAP. DEF. J. 1 (2000) (for
suggested argument).
44. Barnabei, 214 F.3d at 472.
45. Id. (citing Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 1998); Bennett v. Angelone, 92




Barnabei attempted to force her to have anal sex." Barnabei had requested
that the Commonwealth provide notice of its intent to introduce evidence
of unadjudicated criminalconduct. 4' The Prosecution responded that "a
continuous course of threatening and assaultive conduct against the former
Paula Argenio Barnabei" would be proffered. "9 Barnabei claimed that he
was unfairly surprised and that Barto's testimony was misrepresented by the
Prosecution because the notice provided by the Commonwealth was not
specific enough.'
The Fourth Circuit began by dismissing the Commonwealth's claim
that Barnabei had procedurally defaulted this issue."' Barnabei's counsel
lodged a strenuous objection, and asked the trial judge to strike the testi-
mony and declare a mistrial.5 2 The Prosecution posited that Barnabei's
objection was based solely on state law, but the court stated that the objec-
tion went to the fundamental fairness of Barto's testimony." Thus, the
issue was preserved on constitutional grounds despite the fact that the
objection was based on state law.' Also, on direct appeal, Barnabei linked
the admission of Barto's testimony to a violation of his federal constitu-
tional rights and the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected the argument on
the merits."5 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit determined that it was also
appropriate to consider Barnabei's argument on the merits.'
In support of his claim of unfair surprise, Barnabei sought to rely on
Gardner v. Florida."7 In Gardner, the Supreme Court vacated the death
sentence, in part, because defendant was denied access to information in the
presentence investigation report upon which the court relied to impose its
sentence." However, the Fourth Circuit determined that Gray v.








54. ld. The court posited that it was not barred from considering the argument simply




57. Id. at 473; see Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977) (examining a death
sentence imposed on basis of information in a presentence investigation report to which the
petitioner had been denied access).
58. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 362.
59. 518 U.S. 152 (1996).
60. Barnabei, 214 F.3d at 472; see Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 156-57 (1996)
(examining doctrine of "unfair surprise," the court held that a habeas petitioner, who had
[Vol. 13:1
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murder and argued that his death sentence should be vacated because during
sentencing the Prosecution introduced crime scene and medical evidence
linking the defendant to an unsolved double murder. 6 The Prosecution had
previously assured defense counsel that it would restrict evidence of the
double murders solely to testimony and not other sorts of evidence. 2 The
Supreme Court said that habeas relief is appropriate only if "a state court
considering the [petitioner's] claim at the time his conviction became final
would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule
[he] seeks was required by the Constitution.'
The Court viewed Gray's argument as a claim that he was entitled to
more than a day's notic of the Commonwealth's evidence under due
process and that "due process required a continuance whether or not [the
defendant] sought one, or that, if he chose not to seek a continuance,
exclusion was the only appropriate remedy for the inadequate notice.'
The Court held that only the adoption of a new constitutional interpreta-
tion could establish these propositions." Further, the Court distinguished
Gardner from Gray by noting that in Gardner, the petitioner had no oppor-
tunity to see the confidential information let alone contest it, while in Gray,
petitioner had opportunity to hear testimony and cross examine the wit-
ness. 
6
The Fourth Circuit determined that Barnabei's claim that the Com-
monwealth's description of "a continuous course of threatening and
assaultive conduct" was insufficient to put Barnabei on notice as to the
content of Barto's testimony was not sufficiently distinguishable from Gray
so as to cause the court to disregard Gray completely. Rather, the court
noted that Gray's holding explicitly rejected the dissent's proposed constitu-
tional rule that a capital defendant must be afforded a meaningful opportu-
nity to explain or deny the evidence introduced against him at sentencing.68
been convicted and sentenced to death, asked that his sentence be vacated because during the
penalty phase, the prosecution had introduced crime scene and medical evidence linking the
defendant to an earlier, unsolved double murder).
61. Gray, 518 U.S. at 156-57.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 166 (citation omitted). This rule, called the "new rule" doctrine was enunci-
ated in a plurality decision in Tea v. Lane. Barnabei, 214 F.3d at 473; see Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1989) (plurality opinion).
64. Gray, 518 U.S. at 167.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 168.
67. Barnabei, 214 F.3d at 473. Specifically, the court said that if the Commonwealth's
description of Barto's testimony was insufficient to put Barnabei on notice, then he effec-
tively got no notice at all, as opposed to the one day notice given to Gray. Id. The court also
pointed out that the evidence introduced in Gray was significantly more "explosive" than the




The Fourth Circuit stated that Barnabei failed to identify any intervening
precedent that would have allowed the court to ignore Gray's holdingY
The Fourth Circuit further stated that Barnabei failed to establish that due
process requires advance notice of the specific evidence of unadjudicated
conduct that the Prosecution intends to introduce during sentencing.7"
Barnabei also claimed that the Commonwealth's dliberate vagueness
in its notice constituted prosecutorial misrepresentation.71 The court
summarily dismissed this claim by distinguishing Barnabei's case from
Mooney v. Holohan," which Barnabei had cited.73 The court further stated
that the facts, even as alleged by Barnabei, do not support a finding of a
constitutional violation based on prosecutorial misrepresentation.' Thus,
the Commonwealth is not obligated to be extremely specific regarding
testimony about unadjudicated criminal conduct.
G. Jury Instruction
Finally, Bamabei argued based on Simmons v. South Carolina"5 that his
due process and Eighth Amendment rights were violated because the judge
refused to give an instruction that, if sentenced to life imnprisonment,
Barnabei would not be eligible for parole for twenty-five years." The court
held that a Simmons instruction was Only required when the defendant is
parole ineligible." Because Barnabei would have been eligible for parole in
twenty-five years, the Simmons rule did not apply.7"
Virginia has abolished parole for all felony offenses committed on or
after January 1, 1995." For all capital crimes committed after January 1,




72. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
73. Barnabei, 214 F.3d at 474 (distinguishing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 110-12
(1935) (discussing a prosecutor's deliberate deception of court and jury by knowingly
introducing perjured testimony at trial)).
74. Id.
75. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
76. Barnabei, 214 F.3d at 474; see Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 156 (1994)
(mandating that "life means life" jury instruction is only required when the Prosecution
argued for the death penalty on the basis of the defendant's future dangerousness and a life
sentence for the defendant would be without possibility of parole).
77. Barnabei, 214 F.3d at 474.
78. Id.
79. VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-165.1 (Michie 2000).
80. See Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 602,616 (Va. 1999) (finding that the
jury must be instructed that 'life means life" upon the defendant's request when the defen-
dant has been convicted of capital murder); VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-165.1 (Michie 2000); see
also VA. CODE ANN. 5 53.1-40.01 (Michie 2000) (eliminating the possibility of geriatric parole
[Vol. 13:1
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murders in Barnabei's case were committed before January 1, 1995, he was
not entitled to a Simmons instruction.
H. Epilogue
Barnabei was executed by lethal injection on September 14,2000, at the
Greensville Correctional Center.8 In the weeks preceding the execution,
upon Barnabei's request, Governor Jim Gilmore approved DNA testing of
fingernail clippings taken from Wisnosky's body. 2 This evidence was
missing from the Norfolk Circuit Court clerk's office and was located three
days later in the "wrong room."8 3 Governor Gilmore said there was no
evidence that the fingernail clippings were tampered with and ordered them
to be tested. 4 Barnabei appealed, arguing that his rights were violated when
agents of the state tampered with the evidence. This effort failed in federal
court.' The tests revealed DNA from both Wisnosky and Barnabei on the
fingernail clippings, and Governor Gilmore denied a stay of execution. 7
Christina S. Pignatelli
for inmates convicted of a dass one felony).
81. Frank Green, BanbeiExecutedforKilling Wisnosky, RICH.TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept.
15, 2000, at Al.
82. Id. at A8.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
2000]

